



# **UNODC STUDY GUIDE**

## Agenda Item: Addressing Intentional Homicide

### Table of Contents

1. Letter from The Secretary General
2. Letter from The Under Secretary General of UNODC
3. Introduction to The Committee
  - a. What is UNODC?
4. Introduction to The Agenda Item
  - a. What is Intentional Homicide?
5. Root Causes of the Issue
  - a. Poverty and Inequality
  - b. Education and Social Services
  - c. Drug Usage and Mental Health
  - d. Mental or Physical Abuse
6. Types of Homicides and How Are They Investigated?
  - a. Murder
    - i. Degrees of Murder
    - ii. Criminal Charges in International Law
  - b. Manslaughter
    - i. Types of Manslaughter
    - ii. Criminal Charges in International Law
7. Gang Involvements In The Matter
  - a. What is a gang?
  - b. Youth Involvement in Gangs
8. Weapons and Escalation of Violence
9. Diving Deeper Into Gang Culture
  - a. Types of Gangs
    - i. Street Gangs
    - ii. Prison Gangs
10. Hot Spots and Active Violence in These Areas
  - a. Latin America and Caribbean

- i. Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13)
- ii. 18th Street Gang (Barrio 18)
- iii. Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC)
- iv. The Red Command (Comando Vermelho – CV)
- v. G9 Family and Allies
- vi. Tren de Aragua
- vii. Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG)

b. Europe

- i. Cosa Nostra
- ii. Camorra
- iii. Albanian Mafia

11. UN Organs and NGO Acts In The Matter

- a. Amnesty International
- b. Human Rights Watch
- c. Geneva Declaration Secretariat on Armed Violence

12. Economic Dimensions of Organized Crime and Intentional Homicide

- a. Economic Incentives Behind Organized Crime
- b. Illicit Financial Flows and Money Laundering
- c. The Shadow Economy and Informal Markets
- d. Economic Cost and Macroeconomic Impact of Homicide
- e. Financial Systems Used by Criminal Networks
- f. Drug Economies and Violent Competition
- g. Corruption and Financial Governance Failures
- h. Economic Drivers of Gang Recruitment
- i. Financial Disruption Strategies Against Organized Crime
- j. Economic Prevention and Development Strategies
- k. Data and Indicators Relevant to the Debate

13. QUESTIONS TO ADDRESS

14. BIBLIOGRAPHY

## 1. Letter from The Secretary General

Esteemed delegates of TFLMUN'26,

It is a great honour to welcome you to one of the most vivid and inspirational events in our city. As the Secretary General of this valuable conference, it is my pleasure to be a part of the experience.

Our special executives and deliberately selected organization members have set their first priority to seek all of your interests, and we all specifically see our event as a mission to be superior and the most inspirational. Speaking for myself and our team, we worked tirelessly day and night without hesitation for your best interests and to provide you the opportunity to express yourself in every aspect as a delegate of TFLMUN'26. We state that each and every one of our conference's delegates is held in high esteem, and you are welcomed equally. We believe that TFLMUN'26 is going to be one of the only events where everyone is free to be themselves comfortably and enjoy the spirit of Model United Nations.

By attending our conference, you will have the opportunity to engage in meaningful debates, challenge yourself in the aspect of self-confidence, and improve yourself intellectually. You will feel the excitement of new friendships, and most importantly, you will experience the quality of the sensational conference first-hand. We urge you to comprehend that besides being a platform to debate, our conference will be the journey to your personal growth along with unique entertainment.

We look forward to witnessing all of our delegates' efforts and determination. Let TFLMUN'26 be the step for your excellence and self-growth!

Yours faithfully,

Adal Çavuşlu

Secretary General of TFLMUN'26

[cavusluadal@gmail.com](mailto:cavusluadal@gmail.com)

## **2.Letter from The Under Secretary General of UNODC**

Esteemed delegates, I am most honored to welcome you to TFLMUN'26. I hope we all will have a great time and experience. I can not express how excited I am to meet you all fellow delegates and spend an eventful three day journey. I sincerely hope this conference and our committee will bring all of you a new perspective on the crucial topic which we will discuss in the committee.

Understanding homicide is not solely about understanding the statistics but recognizing that those numbers represent people and families forever destroyed by violence. Each and every act of homicide leaves a permanent impact on our communities. By raising awareness and searching for justice for those who are not able to have it we can prevent any more loses due to violence. Education and awareness programs are key in the matter, building strong connections between communities hold significant importance as well. Together we can foster safer environments and work toward a future where violence is not a part of daily routine. Every life matters and every effort does make a difference.

Hopefully this committee will bring out your most humane thoughts, your starvation for justice and all your hate for the systems that fail us all. May you always choose wisdom and grace over this ache for power.

Yours sincerely,

Yağmur GÜRBÜZ

The Under-Secretary General

[yagmur.grbz1@gmail.com](mailto:yagmur.grbz1@gmail.com)

### **3. Introduction to the Committee**

#### ***a. What is UNODC?***

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is a global leader in the fight against illicit drugs and international crime, in addition to being responsible for implementing the United Nations lead program on terrorism. Established in 1997, UNODC has approximately 500 staff members worldwide. Its headquarters are in Vienna and it operates 20 field offices, as well as liaison offices in New York and Brussels.

UNODC works to educate people throughout the world about the dangers of drug abuse and to strengthen international action against illicit drug production and trafficking and drug-related crime. To achieve those aims, UNODC has launched a range of initiatives, including alternatives in the area of illicit drug crop cultivation, monitoring of illicit crops and the implementation of projects against money laundering.

UNODC also works to improve crime prevention and assist with criminal justice reform in order to strengthen the rule of law, promote stable and viable criminal justice systems and combat the growing threats of transnational organized crime and corruption. In 2002, the General Assembly approved an expanded program of activities for the Terrorism Prevention Branch of UNODC. The activities focus on providing assistance to States, on request, in ratifying and implementing the eighteen universal legal instruments against terrorism

### **4. Introduction to The Agenda Item**

#### ***a. What is Intentional Homicide?***

Intentional homicide is the ultimate crime and has ripple effects that go far beyond the original loss of human life. For homicide also blights the lives of the victim's family and community, who may therefore be described as "secondary victims". It creates a violent environment that has a negative impact on society, the economy and government institutions. Homicide is not limited to people living on the margins of society; rather, it can affect all people, irrespective of their age, sex, ethnicity and socioeconomic background. Since homicide has an impact on people from all walks of life, all facets of homicide need to be analyzed. The study of intentional homicide is relevant not only because of the gravity of the offence, but also because intentional homicide is one of the most measurable and comparable indicators for monitoring violent deaths. Because of its lethal outcome, homicide is particularly amenable to temporal (longitudinal) and cross-national (geographic) comparisons: it tends to have greater definitional specificity than other crimes in different historical and national contexts.

Homicide is an act that meets with virtually universal condemnation, and homicide statistics are accordingly considered to be relatively reliable and valid – both at the

national level and for longitudinal and cross-national comparisons. As a readily measurable indicator, homicide is both a reasonable proxy for violent crime and a robust indicator of levels of violence within States. When attempting to measure the scale of homicide it is important to have a clear definition that provides guidance on which specific acts of killing are to be considered intentional homicide. Certain contextual challenges may arise when intentional killings have to be disentangled from other killings during situations of collective violence, such as armed conflict or civil unrest.

## **5. Root Causes of The Issue**

As we all acknowledge solving issues important as homicide we have to dig deep into the root causes. Outcome may differ from region to region but roots are always mostly identical. Going into the depths of the issue in communities is a way to untangle a web of crimes.

### ***a. Poverty and Inequality***

Studies show a link between the increase in income inequality and the frequency of financial crises in capitalist systems, whether in advanced economies or developing economies involved in the globalization process. It increases the likelihood of economic and social policies that impede growth, and where poverty reduction and social institutions are fragile, inequality further discourages the civil and social life that underpins the collective decision-making necessary for healthy societies to function.

Comparative analyses involving countries with different types of welfare state institutions can help us understand the consequences of different strategies to reduce poverty and inequality. Many studies show that access to opportunities in the labor market. Access to income-related opportunities not only affects criminal behavior but also crime rates are affected by the range of opportunities. In particular it is observed that there is an inverse relationship such as an increase in crime rates when wage incomes are reduced.

In conclusion countries that have a high inequality of income have a higher rate of crime and homicides due to major differences in the financial ability to buy products and services. This alone could bring many people into committing crime just to fill their hungry stomachs. On the other end countries with lower inequality of income have a lower rate of crime when compared to countries that have a higher inequality of income.

### ***b. Education and Social Services***

Education from an early age plays a significant role to teach the young generation the difference of right and wrong. Teaching the underlying conditions that lead to violence is an important step in education. Education increases economical

opportunities, improves cognitive and emotional intelligence and socializes individuals into nonviolent norms all of which reduce the risk of violent behavior in minors. Social services such as well-fare support programs, mental health care centers, family assistance via counselors and cost-free community programs can reduce poverty related stress, stabilize household issues and prevent substance usage or undiscovered mental illnesses. These programs can also have positive affects on the matter of inter-generational transmission of violent behavioral issues. Education and social services should be fully funded by governments to help the communities in the best way possible to be able to successfully lower the crime rates and eliminate the risk of early violent behavior.

***c. Drug Usage and Mental Health***

Drug usage and mental health issues are connected to homicide mainly through their effects on impulse control, wrong judgement and social stability. Untreated or misdiagnosed mental issues especially when combined with stress, lack of support or any kind of drug usage or addiction can increase the risk of violent behavior, even though most people with mental illness are documented to be not violent sudden shocks or stress may cause other unfortunate outcomes.

Drug abuse further increases homicide risks by impairing decision making, increasing aggression or allowing misconceptions turning into conflicts when intoxicated. Stress caused by debt or other triggering factors can also lead to violence. Mental health services and additional treatments may be limited when it is most needed. Early intervention, treatment and social support may significantly reduce the likelihood that mental illnesses of drug abuse will turn into lethal violence.

***d. Mental or Physical Abuse***

Mental or physical abuse can significantly increase the risk of future violent actions or homicide. Children that were exposed to any kind of abuse by their parents or any other person in their life may suffer from long term psychological outcomes. These outcomes may differ from individual to individual however the most important resolution of these abused children are future mental illnesses and behavioral issues that may turn violent over time if met with other unfortunate abusing aspects or unwanted situations. These children or mentioned individuals are likely to develop depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder(PTSD) which can impair impulse control, emotional regulation and judgment skills. Abuse is a key component of Adverse Childhood Experiences(ACEs) which are strongly associated with drug abuse or usage, aggressive behavioral issues, involvement in crime later in life. These children also may carry these abusive acts they have endured to their own lives and may integrate these acts into their own relationships which have the high risk of contributing to lethal violence.

## 6. Types of Homicides and How Are They Investigated?

Understanding that homicide does have various types depending how the crime was committed. Different cases call for different laws and criminal charges to be implemented. Addressing every and all types of homicide and comprehending each law carries significant importance when addressing solutions and understanding the agenda item.

### *a. Murder*

Cases of murder are investigated under degrees depending on reasons of intention, rate of harshness and other aspects may be taken into consideration. Murder as it can be explained simply by killing an individual with or without proper reasoning even if the suspect does have an proper reason they are still charged with murder. The results of cases are usually show differences due to different laws and policies in different countries.

#### *i. Degrees of Murder*

First Degree Murder: Planned and Premeditated Killing

First degree murder refers to premeditated killing with clear planning or aggravated circumstances. Many jurisdictions treat this as the gravest form of homicide. Common aggravating factors can be listed as: killing of protected individuals such as police or children, murders committed during another violent felony such as rape or arson.

Second Degree and Depraved-Heart Murder: Intent Without Premeditation

Second-degree murder involves intentional killing without premeditation. It also includes depraved-heart murder, where the killer acts with extreme recklessness and disregard for human life.

Felony-Murder Rule: Lethal Consequences of Dangerous Crimes

Under the felony-murder rule, someone can be charged with murder—even without intent—if a death occurs during the commission of certain dangerous felonies. This underscores the principle that some criminal actions carry an inherent risk of loss of life.

#### *ii. Criminal Charges in International Law*

Under international criminal law, crimes equivalent to first-degree murder such as wilful killing as a war crime, murder or extermination as crimes against humanity, genocide or torture resulting in death carry some of the harshest penalties available. The International Criminal Court (ICC) may impose imprisonment for a fixed term of up to 30 years or life imprisonment with life sentences typically reserved for the most serious cases involving extreme brutality, large numbers of victims or leadership responsibility. In addition to imprisonment the Court may

order fines, forfeiture of assets and reparations to victims including compensation and rehabilitation. Importantly, international courts do not apply the death penalty emphasizing long-term incarceration, accountability and justice for victims instead.

***b. Manslaughter***

Manslaughter is a criminal offense involving the unlawful killing of a person without the intent to kill or premeditation required for murder. It sits between accidental death and murder in seriousness.

In general, manslaughter carries lighter penalties than murder because the level of intent and moral blameworthiness is lower though sentences can still be severe depending on the jurisdiction and circumstances.

***i. Types of Manslaughter***

Voluntary manslaughter occurs when a person intentionally kills but under circumstances that reduce culpability such as provocation, loss of self-control or imperfect self-defense.

Involuntary manslaughter involves an unintentional killing caused by reckless, negligent or unlawful conduct such as dangerous driving, careless use of a weapon, or criminal negligence.

***ii. Criminal Charges in International Law***

For manslaughter, sentences are usually much lighter than for murder because the killing lacks full intent or premeditation, but they are still serious and vary by country. In most legal systems, offenders face fixed-term imprisonment rather than life sentences, commonly ranging from 5 to 20 years, depending on factors such as the level of recklessness or negligence, use of a weapon, number of victims, and prior criminal history. Unlike international crimes, manslaughter sentences are determined almost entirely by national criminal law, not international courts.

**7. Gang Involvements In The Matter**

Street gangs are known for their territorial nature and demand high loyalty from members, which can lead to public displays of violence intended to assert dominance and instill fear. Gang members frequently promote their violent actions through graffiti and publicly claiming responsibility for crimes, thereby providing investigators with potential leads. Conversely, this same bravado can complicate legal processes, as the fear instilled in communities can deter witnesses from coming forward. The culture of silence among gang members, coupled with the threat of retaliation, perpetuates cycles of violence and complicates prosecution

efforts. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for comprehending the broader implications of gang violence in society.

**a. *What is a gang?***

Whose members collectively identify themselves by adopting a group identity, which they use to create an atmosphere of fear or intimidation, frequently by employing one or more of the following: a common name, slogan, identifying sign, symbol, tattoo or other physical marking, style or color of clothing, hairstyle, hand sign or graffiti.

Whose purpose in part is to engage in criminal activity and which uses violence or intimidation to further its criminal objectives, whose members engage in criminal activity or acts of juvenile delinquency that if committed by an adult would be crimes with the intent to enhance or preserve the association's power, reputation or economic resources.

**b. *Youth Involvement in Gangs***

Youth gangs are organized groups of young individuals, typically comprising at least three members, who engage in delinquent behavior and foster values that support their criminal activities. While juvenile crime overall has declined, gang-related crimes have surged in recent years, illustrating the complex social dynamics surrounding these groups. Historically, youth gangs emerged in urban areas during the early twentieth century, primarily among newly arrived immigrant populations, and have evolved significantly since then, particularly in response to socioeconomic factors such as poverty and discrimination.

Modern youth gangs often exhibit multiracial membership and have increasingly welcomed female members, with many young individuals remaining active into adulthood. These groups can vary widely in structure and cohesiveness, with some being loosely organized and engaging in minor delinquent acts, while others, known as "supergangs," operate with intricate hierarchies and engage in serious criminal activities, including drug trafficking and violent crimes. Gang violence, often fueled by increased access to firearms and rivalry between groups, has significant repercussions for both members and their communities.

Researches shows that peer status in adolescence is positively associated with school achievement and adjustment. However, subculture theories of juvenile delinquency and school-based ethnographies suggest that disadvantaged boys are often able to gain some forms of peer status through violence and membership in violent groups undermines educational attainment. Building on these ideas, we use peer network data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health) to examine whether peer status within highly violent groups increases male risks of high school dropout. Consistent with the sub-cultural argument, we find that disadvantaged boys with high status in violent groups are at much greater risks of high school dropout than other students.

## **8. Weapons and Escalation of Violence**

Firearms are used in around 25% of homicides in Europe. More so than other weapons commonly used in violent encounters, firearms have the ability to inflict lethal injuries. Yet, theoretical approaches to understanding the impact of firearms on the prevalence, lethality, and nature of violent encounters are scarce and have been developed almost exclusively within and for the context of the United States, where the levels of firearm violence and firearm availability are much higher than in Europe, limiting their applicability to the European context. To address this issue, European empirical data are reviewed in this paper to critically assess the few existing theoretical approaches focusing on the use of firearms in lethal and non-lethal violence.

Compared with other global regions, the firearm homicide rate in Europe is low. According to the available crime statistics, the European firearm homicide rate has been declining steadily in recent years and is estimated at 0.3 per 100,000 inhabitants, whereas the global average is 3.1 . Moreover, in Europe, only 20% of homicides involve a firearm, while more than 50% of all homicides globally are committed with a firearm. Regardless of these relatively low statistics, around 1,000 lives are taken by firearms annually in Europe, and the European Commission (2020) highlights the significant role of firearms in (violent) crimes, including “domestic violence that may escalate into homicide, terrorism, illicit drugs trafficking, trafficking of human beings, smuggling of migrants, maritime piracy, counterfeiting, environmental crime, or organized property crime” .

The high lethality of firearms, their prevalence in European homicides, and their role in (violent) crimes overall warrant a closer look at the impact of firearms on the prevalence and nature of (lethal) violence. However, the use of weapons in homicide in general and firearms specifically is largely understudied in the European context. In particular, theoretical and conceptual approaches to the understanding of firearm use in homicides are rarely directly assessed using European empirical data, with most studies on firearm homicides remaining descriptive in nature. Furthermore, the few approaches originating from the United States—a context with significantly higher levels of homicide as well as firearm availability (Karp, 2018)—are not tested for their applicability to the European context. Thus, both empirical and theoretical gaps exist, prompting this study. To address the current theoretical gaps in knowledge, in this work, two sets of relevant theoretical approaches originating from the United States are critically reviewed using European empirical data. Namely, the Weapon Lethality Hypothesis and the Weapon Facilitation Hypothesis are employed to address the impact of the use of firearms on the prevalence of homicide, whereas the Adversary Effects Hypothesis and the Physical Strength Hypothesis focus on the nature of homicide. In examining their relevance in the European context, the aim is to elucidate what is known and what needs to be known about firearm homicides to guide future research.

The first set of theoretical approaches addresses the impact of firearms on the prevalence of violence and, in particular, homicide rates. Specifically, the two

aforementioned hypotheses argue that an increase in the availability of firearms leads to an increase in levels of lethal violence, albeit from two different argumentative standpoints. The Weapon Lethality Hypothesis posits an increase in homicide rate due to the firearm's lethality, whereby greater availability of firearms may lead to an increase in their use in assaults and the resulting fatalities, both intended and unintended (Zimring, 1967). On the contrary, Altheimer and Boswell's (2012) interpretation of the Weapon Facilitation Hypothesis purports that the firearm's lethality and power it provides may encourage a perpetrator to commit a violent (lethal) crime they would otherwise not have committed, for example, to avoid a physical encounter with the victim. As a result, the authors argue that the number of potential perpetrators increases, which in return should lead to an increase in firearm homicides and homicides overall.

In contrast, the Deterrence Hypothesis (Kleck, 1988) postulates that widespread availability of firearms may lead to a decrease in (lethal) violence, as perpetrators would refrain from using violence when confronted with a victim who may also carry a firearm. In a similar vein, according to the Weapon Substitution Hypothesis, the lethal intent of a motivated offender—rather than the availability of a particular weapon—determines the outcome for the victim (Wolfgang, 1958). Thus, the nonavailability of a firearm would not change the lethal outcome of a violent assault, as the perpetrator would choose another weapon or modus operandi (a method of operation or pattern of criminal behavior so distinctive that separate crimes or wrongful conduct are recognized as the work of the same person). The association between firearm availability and homicide rate has been extensively studied in the U.S. context, and the findings largely indicate that higher availability of firearms is associated with higher homicide rates, on the national, regional, and local levels (for an overview of these studies, see Hepburn & Hemenway, 2004).

The empirical evidence for a positive correlation between firearm availability and homicide rate in Europe is not as straightforward and is at times contradicting. First, there are only a few studies as a part of which the relation between firearm availability and homicide rates was empirically tested, as indicated by a recent systematic review . Some international comparative studies have also included European countries. The overall results show weak support for a higher availability of firearms leading to an increase in the overall homicide rate, as correlations remained statistically non-significant once outliers, such as the United States, were removed.

Only a few studies so far have focused exclusively on Europe, and their findings are inconsistent. For example, according to a 2015 report issued by the Flemish Peace Institute, the correlation between firearm ownership and the overall homicide rate is not supported by the available evidence (Duquet & van Alstein, 2015). In contrast, findings published by the UNODC (2019) indicate that higher estimated levels of civilian-held firearms are associated with higher levels of firearm homicides and overall levels of homicides. These differing results are contradicted even further by an earlier study conducted by Altheimer and Boswell (2012) that focused exclusively on Eastern European countries<sup>1</sup> , where greater firearm availability was associated with lower firearm homicide and overall homicide rates. Some of the differences in these findings may be explained by the use of data from varying sources and years, yet an

examination of the most recent available information on homicide rates from the UNODC and estimations of civilian firearm ownership (Karp, 2018) do not show a clear association either (see Figure 2). Thus, there seems to be no consensus regarding the direct association between firearm availability and homicide rates.

## **9. Diving Deeper Into Gang Culture**

Modern gangs can be described as the new urban tribes. They consist of groups of people possessed of a common language, culture or territory; the bonds that hold the groups together revolve around the attitudes that members have toward each other and behavior patterns of cooperation and mutual assistance that demonstrate those attitudes. Gangs claim land, have their own internal organizations, make their own rules, conduct rites of passage, operate in the common interest, and identify themselves as a people separate from the rest of society. Many gangs and gang members share numerous characteristics, including: a code of conduct; selective membership; loyalty to group above all else; frequently violent initiation rites; no respect for law, no fear of jail; use of totems or paraphernalia to show membership; unique tattoos, colors, clothing, jewelry; involvement in crimes to make money; internal organization and structure, use of violence to achieve ends, unique funeral rites and unique methods of communicating.

### ***a. Types of Gangs***

There is no particular way to divide gangs into their separate categories, however we can still look into detail in a more low effort required way which is to divide them into categories by the crimes they each commit, how they each form and areas they are active in.

#### ***i. Street Gangs***

There is no generally accepted or established definition of what is a street gang. To focus their actions, the police have devised an administrative definition of a street gang: a street gang is a permanently constituted group whose members collaborate in repeatedly undertaking criminal activities that have a significant impact on public order and safety.

In other words, the police define a street gang as a group of people who commit crimes together, or at least in collusion, on a continuous basis. Street gang crime is likely to endanger the order and safety of public places or cause a feeling of insecurity in a particular area. The offenses include serious violent crime, possession of firearms or bladed weapons, and narcotics offenses involving violence or the threat of violence. However, street gangs may also be involved in cyber-crime and other offenses aimed at significant financial gains.

In addition to the definition, there are a number of observed general features of street gangs. Street gangs often have a networked structure, their active members are adolescent males or young adult males, and they are often associated with a specific city district.

Street gangs are linked to various types of homicide such as drive-by shootings, public shootings, retaliation killings and turf related murders. These acts may happen spontaneous or may be planned further ahead but in both ways the situation escalates fast due to weapons and reputation issues. Violence tends to spread through cycles of revenge.

## ***ii. Prison Gangs***

Prison gangs work to recruit members with street smarts and loyalty and they look for inmates who will be able to carry out the gangs' functions and exercise force when necessary. They also create a structure to monitor activities of members and regulate the behavior of existing members within the gangs to ensure internal cohesion.

To ensure that high quality, dedicated members are being recruited, many prison gangs rely on existing members to vouch for or refer new members into the group. To enter gangs, members often have to prove their loyalty through costly activity, often violent hazing or committing some crime such as theft. Gang members mark themselves as part of the gang with tattoos (or colors, on the streets) so that taxpayers know they are credible collectors and so that gangs can keep track of their members as they move in and out of prison.

Prison gangs have a deeper understanding of hierarchy than street gangs. This high leaderships may use violence or homicide to keep members in line or to punish them due to betrayal or any undisciplined acts. Killings in prisons are called 'hits', these so called contracted killings, enforcement murders inside prison or organized retaliation killings outside prison can be ordered from these 'leaders'.

## ***iii. Organized Crime Gangs***

Organized crime refers to transnational, national, or local groups of centralized enterprises that engage in illegal activities, most commonly for profit. While organized crime is generally considered a form of illegal business, some criminal organizations, such as terrorist groups, rebel groups, and separatists, are politically motivated. Many criminal organizations rely on fear or terror to achieve their goals and maintain control within their ranks. These groups may adopt tactics similar to those used by authoritarian regimes to maintain power. Some forms of organized crime exist simply to meet demand for illegal goods or to facilitate trade in products and services banned by the state, such as illegal drugs or firearms. In other cases, criminal organizations force people to do business with them, as when gangs extort protection money from shopkeepers. Street gangs may be classified as organized crime groups under broader definitions, or may develop sufficient discipline to be considered organized crime under stricter definitions.

A criminal organization can also be referred to as an outfit, a gangster/gang, thug, crime family, mafia, mobster/mob, (crime) ring, or syndicate; the network, subculture, and community of criminals involved in organized crime may be referred to as the underworld or gangland. Sociologists sometimes specifically distinguish a "mafia" as a type of organized crime group that specializes in the supply of extra-legal protection and quasi-law enforcement. Academic studies of the original "Mafia", the Sicilian Mafia, as well as its American counterpart, generated an economic study of organized crime groups and exerted great influence on studies of the Russian mafia, the Indonesian preman, the Chinese triads, the Hong Kong triads, the Indian thuggee, and the Japanese yakuza.

'The Mafia' will usually participate in assassinations, witness elimination, rival cartel executions and mass-casualty events linked to trafficking disputes. These murders are typically not emotional or the heat of the moment but are rather planned acts done in order to achieve a goal. Violence is used to protect the business interest, to eliminate competition or to silence those who know something. Organized crime conflicts distribute significantly to national homicide rates.

## **10. Hot Spots and Active Violence in These Areas**

Hot spots are important while addressing the issue. Starting from these areas homicide rates may be lowered by the help of governments while breaking down the reasons for why that particular area is popular between violent groups.

### ***a. Latin America and Caribbean***

Latin America holds many violent gangs and organized groups in itself and many that work worldwide as well. The region accounts for a large share of global homicides while several countries in the region hold the highest national murder rates.

#### ***i. Mara Salvatrucha(MS-13)***

Mara Salvatrucha, commonly known as MS-13, is an international criminal gang that originated in Los Angeles, California, in the 1980s. Originally, the gang was set up to protect Salvadoran immigrants from other gangs in the Los Angeles area. Over time, the gang grew into a more traditional criminal organization. MS-13 has a longtime rivalry with the 18th Street gang.

Many MS-13 members were deported to El Salvador after the end of the Salvadoran Civil War in 1992, or upon being arrested, facilitating the spread of the gang to Central America. The gang is active in many parts of the continental United States, Canada, Mexico, and Central America. Most members are Central American—Salvadorans in particular.

Central Americans are the primary targets of violence and threats of violence by MS-13. Many of the victims are minors. Minors also make up the majority of suspects arrested for killings attributed to MS-13. MS-13 gang members typically arrive in the United States from Central America as unaccompanied minors. Many school districts receiving Central American migrants were reluctant to admit unaccompanied teenagers when they arrived from Central America, which left them at home and vulnerable to gang recruitment. Recruitment is often forced. In El Salvador, children

are recruited while traveling to school, church, or work. Incarcerated youth are usually impressed into a gang during their incarceration. MS-13 are notorious for their violence and a subcultural moral code based on merciless retribution. Aspirants are beaten for 13 seconds as an initiation to join the gang, a ritual known as "jumping-in". At least one faction of MS-13 – the Fulton clique in Los Angeles – has required prospective members to commit a murder in order to be considered for full-fledged membership.

**ii. *18<sup>th</sup> Street Gang (Barrio 18)***

The 18th Street Gang was formed in the Rampart District of Los Angeles in the 1960s by Mexican-Americans and other immigrant youths who were not accepted into existing Hispanic gangs, specifically the Clanton 14 gang. The Clanton 14 gang was composed of mostly second generation Hispanics, and only accepted members of Mexican descent. Some members of Clanton 14 wanted to start a new clique called "Clanton 18th Street" and allow members of other ethnicities to join; however, this proposal was rejected by the Clanton 14, which led to the formation of the 18th Street Gang. The two gangs have been bitter rivals ever since.

18th Street grew by expanding its membership to other nationalities and races, and it was among the first multiracial, multi-ethnic gangs in Los Angeles. In the beginning, they were made up largely of second-generation Hispanics. As the 18th Street Gang began to battle with more established Hispanic gangs, they began to recruit outside the Hispanic community. There are approximately two hundred separate, autonomous gangs operating under the same name within separate barrios in the San Fernando Valley; specifically, in North Hollywood, the San Gabriel Valley, South Bay, Riverside, East Los Angeles, South Los Angeles, Hollywood, Downtown Los Angeles, Northeast Los Angeles, Pico Union, Westlake, Koreatown, Inglewood, South Gate, Huntington Park, Maywood, Bellflower, Long Beach, Orange County, San Bernardino County, and Los Angeles' Westside or West LA, according to the latest figures from the NDIC.

In the early 2000s, the Federal Bureau of Investigation initiated wide-scale raids against known and suspected gang members, netting hundreds of arrests across the country.

**iii. *Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC)***

The Primeiro Comando da Capital, also referred to as Quinze or simply as Partido, is a Brazilian organized crime syndicate. According to a 2023 The Economist report, the PCC is Latin America's biggest drug gang, with a membership of 40,000 lifetime members plus 60,000 "contractors". Its name refers to the São Paulo state capital, the city of São Paulo.

Historically, the PCC has been responsible for several criminal activities such as murders, prison riots, drug trafficking, bank and highway robberies, protection rackets, pimping, kidnappings-for-ransom, money laundering, bribery, loan sharking,

and obstruction of justice, with an expansion focused on drug trafficking since the 2010s. As of 2023, the PCC is currently transitioning into a global mafia, being able to influence politics and penetrate the legal economy.

The group is based in the state of São Paulo and is active throughout Brazil, South America, West Africa and Europe. An international expansion fueled by the cocaine trade made the PCC establish a profitable partnership with the Italian 'Ndrangheta and, as of 2023, run over 50% of Brazil's drug exports to Europe. Through the cocaine trade routes to Europe, the PCC also established itself as a central player in the West African cocaine trade, with its members being able to exert control over neighborhoods in cities such as Lagos and Abuja. According to a leaked Portuguese intelligence report, the group also has around 1,000 associates in Lisbon.

#### ***iv. The Red Command (Comando Vermelho – CV)***

The Red Command (Comando Vermelho – CV) is Brazil's oldest criminal group. Created in a Rio de Janeiro prison in the 1970s as a self-protection group for prisoners, it started out with low-level crimes like muggings and bank robberies. But in the 1980s, the group moved into the cocaine trade, working with Colombian drug cartels and taking on a social leadership role in many of Rio's marginalized neighborhoods.

It has since grown into a sizable national and transnational threat. While still maintaining its power base in poorer neighborhoods around Rio de Janeiro, the Red Command has a major influence in prisons across the country, with the northern region of Amazonas and western state of Mato Grosso being its secondary strongholds. It also has a foothold inside Bolivia, from where it sources much of its cocaine. Its clashes with militia groups and the Pure Third Command (Terceiro Comando Puro – TCP) are a regular source of violence in Rio.

Since 2020, it has had to fend off repeated incursions and massacres by state forces and by militia groups into Rio favelas under its control.

#### ***v. G9 Family and Allies***

The G9 Family and Allies (G9 Fanmi e Alye – G9) is a criminal federation of nine gangs in Haiti's capital of Port-au-Prince. Founded in June 2020 by former police officer turned gang leader Jimmy Chérizier, alias "Barbecue," the coalition allows member gangs to expand their territory and offers politicians a weapon to suppress their opposition.

The G9's main revenue stream is extortion, an economy that takes several forms. The federation charges "protection payments" on local businesses, street vendor stands, and public transportation drivers, while also overseeing kidnapping for ransom of civilians. The G9 has even taken complete control of public services such as

electricity and water provision in exchange for payment. Barbecue and the G9 have been linked to assassinated Haitian President Jovenel Moïse and his Haitian Tèt Kale Party (Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale – PHTK), for whom the federation is alleged to have ensured votes and quelled social unrest in gang-controlled neighborhoods.

The G9 arose out of a relationship between Barbecue, a police officer notorious for extrajudicial massacres, and then-President Moïse. After being fired from the police force, Barbecue and his Delmas 6 gang allegedly continued to receive money, weapons, police uniforms, and government vehicles from the Moïse administration. At the time, Haitians were demanding Moïse's resignation through mass protests. The country's dire economic crisis, rampant corruption, gasoline shortages, and rising violence made Moïse widely unpopular. So when Barbecue announced the formation of the G9 alliance, it appeared aimed at propping up Moïse, following a tradition of Haitian political figures using gangs to repress their opponents and maintain social order in poor neighborhoods. Barbecue promised the coalition would restore peace in Port-au-Prince. But kidnappings soared and internal clashes within the G9 federation led to further bouts of violence.

In a landmark moment for the G9 and Haiti as a whole, in July 2021, a squad of hitmen with military training assassinated Moïse in his private residence. The G9 had already somewhat distanced itself from Moïse, with Barbecue filming a video in June calling for a revolution against political and economic elites, including Moïse's party.

The loss of its main political sponsor, however, did not appear to have much impact on the G9. Instead, Barbecue and G9-affiliated gangs took advantage of the widespread instability in the aftermath of Moïse's death to expand their territory and assert control over key infrastructure, such as Haiti's largest oil terminal, Terminal Varreux. The group continues to clash with its main rival, G-Pèp, on multiple fronts around Port-au-Prince, contributing to what has become one of the world's most urgent humanitarian crises. The death of co-founder Isca Andrice, alias "Iska," in November 2023 represents a major loss for the G9, with Iska possibly holding as much sway as Barbecue in the alliance.

#### ***vi. Tren de Aragua***

The Aragua Train was born in the Tocarón prison, in the state of Aragua. The name of the group may have its origin in a union of a railway project that was never completed. But Héctor Rutherford Guerrero Flores, alias "Warrior Child", turned the Aragua Train into what it is today during his imprisonment in Tocarón.

Under the leadership of Niño Guerrero, Tocarón became one of the prisons more noticeable of the country, largely due to the unofficial policy from the Venezuelan government to hand over control of some prisons, including Tocarón, to criminal bosses known as pranes. This freedom and the criminal income of the gang allowed the construction from a zoo, a swimming pool, a playground, a restaurant and a nightclub inside the prison.

With control of the gang firmly cemented within the prison, the Aragua Train began to expand its influence. Started through the San Vicente neighborhood, where he established strict social and even control received resources and support from the government through its charitable foundation known as “Fundación Somos El Barrio JK”.

Some criminal gangs that already operated in Aragua established non-aggression pacts with the gang, including the Llano Train. However, after the murder from the leader of the Tren del Llano in 2016, the prison group commanded by Guerrero seized its territories in Aragua and part of the Guárico state, according to police sources who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of their safety.

In the following years, the gang expanded its network to other states in Venezuela through alliances with smaller groups, becoming present in at least five other states. During this process, he expanded his criminal portfolio in Venezuela to include extortion, kidnapping, human trafficking for sexual exploitation, migrant smuggling, etc contraband, illegal mining, retail drug trafficking, cybercrime and theft.

### ***vii. Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG)***

The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (Spanish: Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación is a Mexican criminal syndicate based in Jalisco formerly headed by Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes ("El Mencho") until he was killed by the Mexican Army in 2026. The cartel has been characterized by extreme violence and public relations campaigns. Though the CJNG is known for diversifying into various criminal rackets, drug trafficking (primarily cocaine and methamphetamine) remains its most profitable activity. The cartel has been noted for cannibalizing some victims during the training of new sicarios or members, as well as using drones and rocket-propelled grenades to attack enemies.

CJNG started in 2009 as one of the splits of the Milenio Cartel, the other being La Resistencia. CJNG defeated La Resistencia and took control of Milenio's smuggling networks. CJNG expanded its operation network from coast to coast in six months, making it one of the criminal groups with the greatest operating capacity by 2012. Following the emergence of the cartel, homicides, kidnappings and discoveries of mass graves spiked in Jalisco. By 2018, the CJNG was believed to have over 100 methamphetamine labs throughout Mexico. Based on average street value, its trade could net upwards of \$8 billion for cocaine and \$4.6 billion for crystal meth each year. The CJNG are fighting the Nueva Plaza Cartel for control of Guadalajara; La Unión Tepito for Mexico City; Los Viagras and La Familia Michoacana for the states of Michoacán and Guerrero; Los Zetas in the states of Veracruz and Puebla; Cártel del Noreste in Zacatecas; the Sinaloa Cartel in Baja California, Sonora, Ciudad Juárez, Zacatecas and Chiapas; as well as the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel in Guanajuato. They have an alliance with the Cártel del Golfo in Zacatecas and La Línea in Juárez.

CJNG is considered by the Mexican government to be one of the most dangerous criminal organizations in Mexico and the most powerful drug cartel in Mexico. It is also considered the cartel with the most paramilitary firepower. CJNG is heavily

militarized and more violent than other criminal organizations. It has a special operations group for specific types of warfare. Its hitman training program is strict and professional. The cartel is best known for its fights against the Zetas and Templarios, it has fought La Resistencia for control of Aguililla, Michoacán, and its surrounding territories.

*b. Europe*

*i. Cosa Nostra*

The Sicilian Mafia or Cosa Nostra also simply referred to as the Mafia, is an Italian criminal society and criminal organization originating on the island of Sicily and dates back to the mid-19th century. Emerging as a form of local protection and control over land and agriculture, the Mafia gradually evolved into a powerful criminal network. By the mid-20th century, it had infiltrated politics, construction, and finance, later expanding into drug trafficking, money laundering, and other crimes. At its core, the Mafia engages in protection racketeering, arbitrating disputes between criminals, and organizing and overseeing illegal agreements and transactions.

The basic group is known as a "family", "clan", or cosca. Each family claims sovereignty over a territory, usually a town, village or neighborhood (borgata) of a larger city, in which it operates its rackets. Its members call themselves "men of honour", although the public often refers to them as mafiosi. By the 20th century, wide-scale emigration from Sicily led to the formation of mafiosi-style gangs in other countries, in particular in the United States, where its offshoot, the American Mafia, was created. These diaspora-based outfits replicated the traditions and methods of their Sicilian ancestors to varying extents.

In 1876, Leopoldo Franchetti described the Sicilian Mafia as an "industry of violence". In 1993, the Italian sociologist Diego Gambetta described it as a cartel of private protection firms. He further characterized mafiosi as "guarantors of trust", and that Sicilian people tend to be distrustful of each other and therefore routinely seek mafia protection in their business dealings. The central activity of the Mafia is the arbitration of disputes between criminals and the organization and the enforcement of illicit agreements through the use of violence. The Mafia does not serve the general public as the police do, but only specific clients who pay them for protection.

The Sicilian Mafia is not a centralized organization. It is more of an association of independent gangs who sell their services under a common brand. This cartel claims the exclusive right to sell extralegal protection services within their territories, and by their labels (man of honor, mafioso, etc.), they distinguish themselves from common criminals whom they exclude from the protection market.

Franchetti argued that the Mafia would never disappear unless the very structure of the island's social institutions were to undergo a fundamental change. Over a century later, Diego Gambetta concurred with Franchetti's analysis, arguing that the Mafia

exists because the government does not provide adequate protection to merchants from property crime, fraud, and breaches of contract. Gambetta wrote that Sicily (in the early 1990s) had "no clear property rights legislation or administrative or financial codes of practice", and that its court system was "appalling" in its inefficiency. Gambetta recommended that the government liberalize the drug market and abolish price-fixing of cigarettes so as to move these commodities out of the black market; to increase transparency in public contracting so that there can be no rigging, which mafiosi usually arbitrate; and redesign the voting process to make it harder to buy votes. Fixing these problems would reduce the demand for mafioso intervention in political and economic affairs.

## **ii. *Camorra***

The Camorra is an Italian Mafia-type criminal organization and criminal society originating in the region of Campania. It is one of the oldest and largest criminal organizations in Italy, dating to the 18th century. The Camorra's organizational structure is divided into individual groups called "clans". Every capo or "boss" is the head of a clan, in which there may be tens or hundreds of affiliates, depending on the clan's power and structure. The Camorra's main businesses are drug trafficking, racketeering, counterfeiting, and money laundering. It is also not unusual for Camorra clans to infiltrate the politics of their respective areas.

Since the early 1980s and its involvement in the drug trafficking business, the Camorra has acquired a strong presence in other European countries, particularly Spain. Usually, Camorra clans maintain close contact with South American drug cartels, which facilitates the arrival of drugs in Europe.

According to Naples public prosecutor Giovanni Melillo, during a 2023 speech of the Antimafia Commission, the most powerful groups of the Camorra in the present day are the Mazarella clan and the Secondigliano Alliance. The latter is an alliance of the Licciardi, Contini and Mallardo clans.

## **iii. *Albanian Mafia***

The terms Albanian mafia and Albanian organized crime refer collectively to criminal organizations based in Albania or composed of ethnic Albanians. Albanian organized crime is active mostly in Europe and South America, but also in various other parts of the world, including the Middle East and Asia. The Albanian criminal groups participate in a diverse range of criminal enterprises including trafficking in drugs, arms, and humans. Due to their close ties with the 'Ndrangheta of Calabria, they control a large part of the billion dollar wholesale cocaine market in Europe and appear to be the primary distributors of cocaine in various European drug hubs including London. The criminal enterprises of Albanian organized crime is known for their diversification, demonstrating a high degree of criminal capacity.

The Albanian criminal groups has monopolized various international affiliations, from as far east as Israel to as far west as South America. These reports primarily indicate a strong connection between politicians and various Albanian crime groups. According to the Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS), Albanian crime groups are hybrid organizations (i.e. composed of people from various sectors of society), and are often involved in both criminal and political activities.

The Albanian mafia constitutes one of the highest crime generating elements in the world, combining the "traditional" characteristics of organized crime – its rigid internal discipline, its clan structure, its "endogamic closure" (marrying within the organization) which increases the organization's impermeability, and its internal cohesion – with modern and innovative characteristics, such as transnationality. The massive logistic capacity and the diverse nature of Albanian organized crime has facilitated its establishment outside the mother country and its integration with local criminal elements.

## **11. UN Organs and NGO Acts In The Matter**

UN organs such as UNODC and UNDP( United Nations Development Programme) are active organs in the matter. UNODC publishes the Global Study on Homicide which provides recent datasets on worldwide homicide actions while supporting governments with strategies on preventing crime and law enforcement training. UNDP on the other hands is active on the field by running active programs to reduce the root causes of the issue.

### ***a. Amnesty International***

Amnesty International (also referred to as Amnesty or AI) is an international non-governmental organization focused on human rights, with its headquarters in the United Kingdom. The organization says that it has more than ten million members and supporters around the world. The stated mission of the organization is to campaign for "a world in which every person enjoys all of the human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments". The organization has played a notable role on human rights issues due to its frequent citation in media and by world leaders.

AI was founded in London in 1961 by the lawyer Peter Benenson. In what he called "The Forgotten Prisoners" and "An Appeal for Amnesty", which appeared on the front page of the British newspaper The Observer, Benenson wrote about two students who toasted to freedom in Portugal and four other people who had been jailed in other nations because of their beliefs. AI's original focus was prisoners of conscience, with its remit widening in the 1970s, under the leadership of Seán MacBride and Martin Ennals, to include miscarriages of justice and torture. In 1977, it was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. In the 1980s, its secretary general was Thomas Hammarberg, succeeded in the 1990s by Pierre Sané. In the 2000s, it was led by Irene Khan.

Amnesty International is an international human rights organisation that campaigns worldwide to protect individuals' and groups' rights. It conducts research and runs information and education efforts to highlight violations.

***b. Human Rights Watch***

Human Rights Watch investigates and reports on abuses happening in all corners of the world. There are roughly 500 people of 70-plus nationalities who are country experts, lawyers, journalists, and others who work to protect the most at risk, from vulnerable minorities and civilians in wartime, to refugees and children in need. They direct advocacy towards governments, armed groups and businesses, pushing them to change or enforce their laws, policies and practices. To ensure independence they refuse government funding and are strict about their donation partners sharing the same values. They partner with organizations large and small across the globe to protect embattled activists and to help hold abusers to account and bring justice to victims.

***c. Geneva Declaration Secretariat on Armed Violence***

The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development highlights the role that states and civil society must play in preventing and reducing violence associated with war, crime, and social unrest. The Declaration was adopted on 7 June 2006 and is now endorsed by 113 states. It is the strongest political statement to date that addresses the impact of armed violence within a development context. Regular high-level diplomatic regional meetings and ministerial review conferences take place to assess progress concerning the process and implementation of the Geneva Declaration; the first two ministerial review conferences took place in 2008 and 2011. During 2014 a series of Regional Review Conferences have been organized not only to review the process in implementing the Geneva Declaration but also to reflect and gather support in integrating meaningfully armed violence reduction in national and international development processes, including the post-2015 development agenda.

By signing the Geneva Declaration states commit to: Support initiatives to measure the human, social and economic costs of armed violence; undertake assessments to understand and respond to risks and vulnerabilities; evaluate the effectiveness of armed violence prevention and reduction programs around the world and to disseminate lessons and best practices.

Understanding that the fight against the global scourge of armed violence and the prospects for sustainable development are closely linked, the signatories recognize that armed violence constitutes a major obstacle to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. They agree to strengthen their efforts to integrate armed violence reduction and conflict prevention programs into national, regional, and multilateral development frameworks and strategies.

The approach is based on three pillars:

Advocacy: dissemination and coordination initiatives for implementing the Geneva Declaration

Measurability: country based armed violence mapping and monitoring to identify entry-points and opportunities for interventions

Programming: practical programming on armed violence prevention and reduction

A Core Group of 14 signatory states and affiliated organizations is responsible for steering the process and guiding the implementation of the Geneva Declaration. Affiliated organizations include the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Small Arms Survey—which also hosts the Geneva Declaration Secretariat—, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO).

## **12. Economic Dimensions of Organized Crime and Intentional Homicide**

The comprehension of intentional homicide and the organized crime structures through which it is often facilitated extends beyond the simple dynamics of violence. The economic systems through which organized crime is conducted often play a pivotal role in the comprehension of the issue at hand. This section will discuss the economic dimensions of organized crime, from the mechanisms through which individuals are incentivized to join the group to the systems through which organized crime is sustained.

### ***a. Economic Incentives Behind Organized Crime***

Organized crime groups operate in a manner similar to businesses; rather than conducting violence or other illicit practices in a haphazard manner, organized crime groups make rational decisions based upon the potential profitability of their actions, the potential risks of law enforcement, and the markets through which they operate. Organized crime groups tend to focus their activities within illicit markets that have high and sustained levels of demand and in which regulation is inconsistent or ineffective, such as the illicit drug trade, human trafficking, extortion, illicit mining, and the illicit arms trade. In many regions throughout the world in which state institutions are ineffective or formal employment is scarce, the illicit markets through which organized crime operates can be highly lucrative and represent the sole economic option for many individuals.

Economic factors appear to be one of the most common factors in the involvement of individuals in organized crime. This is particularly true in areas that have high unemployment rates and limited opportunities for education. Organized crime provides what the rest of legal society cannot: money, security, and a sense of

belonging. This is particularly true in the formation of youth gangs. The UNODC has indicated that areas that have high levels of socioeconomic disparity also have high levels of organized crime, although the nature of this relationship is often unclear.

A pertinent case study in this regard is the region of Central America. The formation of organizations such as MS-13 and Barrio 18 in the 1990s and early 2000s is particularly reminiscent of the high youth unemployment rates and the high levels of social marginalization that the region was witnessing. An analysis of the violence in El Salvador suggests that the growth of gangs is not purely cultural, but also related to the economic conditions that the country was witnessing at the time, including the implosion of the employment market and vastly limited access to quality education is a reality. In the absence of any substantial opportunity in the legitimate economy, the benefits of gang membership may outweigh the considerable risks, at least in the minds of the young people in these communities.

There are also practical implications of this reality. Enforcement-based strategies, such as policing, incarceration, and military-style crackdowns, have sometimes been ineffective in reducing organized crime, in part because this approach does not address the conditions that allow organized crime to thrive in the first place. Some experts argue that in order to reduce organized crime, law enforcement and economic development strategies must work in tandem.

For the members of this committee, understanding the economics of organized crime may help inform a more comprehensive solution. While violence is a policing issue, it is also a development issue, and solutions that do not account for this are not likely to have lasting effects.

*Sources: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Study on Homicide 2023; Cruz, José Miguel, "The Political Economy of Gang Violence in El Salvador."*

### ***b. Illicit Financial Flows and Money Laundering***

The profits made by organized crime groups have to be laundered, otherwise, they become baggage. Therefore, the concealment of the sources of criminal money, which is known as money laundering, is not an adjunct to organized crime, but the core. Money laundering consists of the usual three stages: placement, which introduces the money into the system through businesses that have high cash transactions; layering, which consists of complex transactions that cross borders, obscuring the original source of the money; and integration, which reintroduces the money into the system as legitimate earnings.

Illicit financial flows, which involve the flow of money across borders through complex transactions, are the lifeline of organized crime groups. Not only does it help the groups to reinvest their earnings, but also to evade prosecution. However, the exact figures of the extent of the phenomenon cannot be determined due to the clandestine nature of the activity. Nevertheless, estimates show that money laundering is a significant percentage of the global economy.

The UN has also developed tools for monitoring illegal financial flows, as included in Sustainable Development Goal Indicator 16.4.1, where UN member states are called upon to reduce illegal financial transactions and organized crime. The tools emphasize the need for coordination and cooperation among FIUs, banks, customs, and law enforcement agencies, as no single country or agency can combat IFFs alone.

A notable example of disrupting illegal financial flows is the seizure of \$246 million in assets of a major money laundering ring, detected by Colombian authorities in 2022, which is believed to be connected to drug trafficking. The figure is a notable example of the scope of the operation and the potential for such illegal financial flows, as well as how much money might be passing through such networks undetected, although less reassuringly, how much money might be passing through such networks undetected.

To combat illegal financial flows, it is necessary to take a hard look at the nexus of financial regulation and crime. Some of the tools and solutions that are consistently recommended include beneficial ownership, improved anti-money laundering measures, and cooperation among FIUs, although the extent of their implementation varies.

*Sources: UNODC, Estimating Illicit Financial Flows; UNODC, SDG Indicator 16.4.1 Methodology; Colombia Reports, "Colombia's Biggest Money Laundering Case of 2022."*

### ***c. The Shadow Economy and Informal Markets***

The term shadow economy refers to economic activities that take place outside the formal regulatory environment. It is characterized by a wide range of activities, including unreported businesses, undeclared employment, and cash transactions that are not recorded. Even though they are not necessarily criminal, they must be distinguished from one another. However, the lack of oversight that characterizes the shadow economy also presents opportunities for criminal organizations, which cannot be ignored.

In the context of economies that have significant segments of their economic activity outside the formal system, law enforcement agencies face major challenges in

identifying financial transactions. Moreover, economies that rely on cash transactions also afford criminal organizations an opportunity to launder their money. As the extent to which they are formally recorded is low, distinguishing between legal and criminal activity can sometimes become extremely challenging.

One of the major challenges that law enforcement agencies face is that criminal organizations have the opportunity to blend their activities with the existing informal economies. As such, they become extremely difficult to distinguish, even if they are being actively pursued.

This phenomenon has been particularly visible in the West African region, which has developed into an important route for the international trade in illicit narcotics. Such economies have relied heavily on cross-border cash trade, which is structurally difficult to monitor. As such, they have also become an important location for the trade in illicit narcotics but also for other illicit financial flows.

In order for the criminal presence in the shadow economies to be reduced, it is likely that the solution must involve both financial inclusion and increased oversight. By increasing the presence of the rule of law, the space available for the criminal networks to operate can be decreased. However, this also requires significant investment in the country's financial infrastructure. For the delegates, the shadow economies must be understood as an important aspect of the environment, rather than the background, as solutions that focus purely on the issue of law enforcement without addressing the economies that support the criminal networks may prove to be less effective.

*Sources: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2023.*

#### ***d. Economic Cost and Macroeconomic Impact of Homicide***

The effects of intentional homicide have far-reaching implications beyond the immediate tragedy of loss of life. The high levels of violence have real and tangible economic implications, and it is this aspect that partly explains why the issue of homicide is viewed as a development issue rather than merely a security issue.

The governments of nations operating in high-violence environments often face significant resource constraints. The need to invest in law enforcement, the judiciary, the prison system, and emergency health services is significant, and in environments characterized by high levels of violence, this often means that governments have to divert fewer funds to education, infrastructure development, and welfare services. The trade-off is not explicitly stated in budgetary meetings, but the consequence is real nonetheless.

Violence also has the overall effect of stifling economic growth in the country at large. The high levels of violence force businesses to relocate, tourism is affected, and the population is forced to move from the affected areas in search of safety and security. The overall consequence is the stagnation of the economy in the long term in

areas characterized by high levels of organized crime. This is evident in Central America and the Caribbean, where the high levels of gang violence have led to stagnation in the affected areas over the long term.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has conducted research that shows the tangible relationship between crime and economic growth. According to the research, an analysis of the region revealed that the high levels of homicide were associated with the decline in economic growth in the region. The relationship between the two issues is likely cyclical, where poverty and unemployment contribute to high levels of crime, and the converse is also true, where high levels of crime contribute to stagnation in the economy. The delegates will therefore have the opportunity to view the issue of violence from the perspective of the economic cost of homicide, and this will provide the opportunity to integrate the issue of security with the issue of development.

*Sources: International Monetary Fund, Western Hemisphere Regional Economic Outlook.*

#### ***e. Financial Systems Used by Criminal Networks***

On a smaller level, criminal organizations are able to exist almost entirely on a cash-based system. However, as these organizations grow and begin to facilitate the movement of funds across borders, they also necessitate access to a higher level of financial sophistication. This forces criminal organizations towards a range of techniques that attempt to exploit weaknesses in the formal financial system and international trade systems.

One of the techniques that has garnered a lot of interest and investigation is the utilization of shell corporations and complex structures of ownership. By creating corporations in a number of different countries, criminal organizations are able to hide the true ownership of the organization, making it difficult, if not virtually impossible, to track the movement of funds back to their source. Financial centers and secrecy jurisdictions, in which the information on beneficial ownership is not readily available, are able to add a further level of complexity.

Another technique that seems to be gaining in importance is the utilization of trade-based money laundering, or TBML. TBML is a technique in which international trade is manipulated in order to move funds across borders, maintaining the illusion of a legitimate trade transaction. Some common techniques involve over-invoicing or under-invoicing the value of the merchandise, or the false representation of the amount of merchandise shipped. As these transactions are conducted in the normal course of international trade, they are surprisingly difficult to detect.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has listed TBML as a critical global financial concern, particularly because it involves multiple countries at any time, each with varying degrees of financial regulations. A suspicious cargo might pass through

a second country before entering a third, with none of these countries having a complete picture of the transaction.

To combat these channels, international collaboration is essential, particularly between financial intelligence units, customs services, financial organizations, and law enforcement. Beneficial ownership lists, increased due diligence, and better oversight of international financial flows are some of the most frequently mentioned measures. This section, therefore, serves to remind the delegates that financial regulations and crime are not easily compartmentalized, particularly because weaknesses in one system create opportunities in another.

*Sources: UNODC, Estimating Illicit Financial Flows; Financial Action Task Force, Trade-Based Money Laundering: Trends and Developments.*

#### ***f. Drug Economies and Violent Competition***

Drug trafficking is the single most profitable domain of transnational organized crime, and the global demand for narcotics drives massive illegal markets that generate billions of dollars annually. Because of their illegitimate nature, conflicts between these illegal markets for narcotics are often settled using violence, and the relationship between the drug trade and increasing homicide rates is one of the best-researched phenomena in the field of criminology.

The difference between drug trafficking and other forms of crime is that it requires complex global supply chains, and production, processing, transport, and distribution of narcotics may take place in completely different countries or even on different continents. Dominance over strategic locations in the supply chain, such as production centers, border crossings, ports, and cities, is extremely valuable, and actors will fight viciously for control of them. Wherever the supply routes of drug trafficking pass, violence is likely to ensue.

The UNODC has monitored this trend in different regions. In Latin America, the intense battles between rival cartels for cocaine routes connecting South American producers with North American and European consumers have traditionally contributed to the emergence of higher homicide rates. Even countries in the route, like Honduras, Guatemala, and some in Mexico, have often been the main victims, irrespective of the fact that they are neither the source nor the destination of the cocaine.

The West African scenario is a relatively newer phenomenon but one that is increasingly alarming. As the cocaine trade from South America to Europe increasingly passes through the West African coastline, criminal organizations are trying to penetrate these countries, and this has caused some concerns about the threat of violence and instability in these countries.

The efforts made by law enforcement agencies in the attempt to curb the routes used by criminals are a clear indication that the problem is not going anywhere; it is just going to change location, a phenomenon also referred to as the "balloon effect."

*Sources: UNODC, World Drug Report 2023; UNODC global cocaine trafficking assessments.*

### ***g. Corruption and Financial Governance Failures***

Corruption is not just a loop-hole, a way in which organized crime gets a helping hand at the margins; it is, in many instances, a necessary condition of its existence. Large-scale organized crime cannot exist without some degree of shelter or complicity with the state. Corruption, in the sense of officials using their position for personal gain, has a tendency to destabilize the entire system of checks and balances, enforcement, and accountability.

Corruption in the sense of officials using their position for personal gain has a tendency to destabilize the entire system of checks and balances, enforcement, and accountability. In some instances, this has taken the form of bribing customs officials to smuggle illicit goods across borders; in others, it has taken the form of paying police officials to turn a blind eye to criminal activities. In each instance, there is a kind of hole in the system through which organized crime is able to pass. In a system where corruption is the norm, these become blind spots in the system, allowing organized crime to flourish with relative impunity.

Corruption also undermines the system of financial regulations and regulations on money laundering. In the case of the latter, if the authorities fail to enforce regulations on money laundering, organized crime syndicates are able to launder money through the banking system with relative impunity. In this sense, it is a kind of subsidy to organized crime, albeit one that is unintentional.

In countries with a high incidence of organized crime, the money that these organizations accumulate also gives them the opportunity to put down roots in the political system over time. In this sense, it is a way in which organized crime buys political influence, not just to avoid prosecution, but also to shape the conditions in which it is able to operate. In this sense, there is a kind of erosion of trust in the system, which may take decades to correct.

For international bodies, the solution has been to emphasize the importance of transparency and accountability in the system. In this sense, the most promising reforms are those in the realm of anti-corruption laws, oversight bodies, and independent judiciaries. For policymakers, the connection between these is obvious.

*Sources: UNODC, anti-corruption frameworks and governance reports.*

#### ***h. Economic Drivers of Gang Recruitment***

Gang recruitment is not a random phenomenon; it tends to cluster in communities where there is considerable economic and social stress, characterized by high levels of unemployment, poor educational systems, and a large gap between the jobs that are legally available and the wages people can realistically expect to earn. In these communities, gangs appear to offer a sense of stability, a sense of identity, and a sense of protection that formal institutions do not.

Youths are the primary target of recruitment, and teenagers and young adults in disadvantaged communities are particularly susceptible to recruitment because they are denied access to education and employment opportunities. Furthermore, the presence of well-established criminal organizations in the community also increases the risk of recruitment, since these organizations exploit pre-existing social networks, and membership in a criminal organization has a high level of social status in communities where it is difficult to achieve status in other ways.

Research on the dynamics of gangs in Central America has revealed that although the primary motivation for recruitment is not purely economic, money does become a much bigger part of the equation the longer the individual is in the organization. Crimes such as extortion, selling narcotics, and robbery provide a source of income that may or may not exist in other ways in the community. While the primary motivation is different, the end result is the same.

For the delegates, examining the role of the economy in the recruitment of gangs could help them develop a strategy to prevent the recruitment of gangs, since it is a short-term solution with a potentially longer-lasting effect. While punitive measures are a necessary part of the solution, it is also important to discuss this in debate, as it is a critical issue in the overall solution to the problem.

*Sources: UNODC, Global Study on Homicide 2023; Cruz, José Miguel, "The Political Economy of Gang Violence in El Salvador."*

#### ***i. Financial Disruption Strategies Against Organized Crime***

There is an increasing recognition among governments and international organizations that apprehending individuals, although necessary, is often insufficient to destroy a criminal organization. New leaders emerge, new recruits are attracted, and the organization evolves. Financial disruption strategies take a different approach, focusing on the economic underpinnings of organized crime groups and how they sustain themselves.

Asset seizure and forfeiture programs are the most common types of tools used for this purpose. By seizing assets, money, and other valuables suspected of being acquired by organized crime groups, governments can reduce the overall strength of organized crime groups by limiting their ability to fund their operations, reward their

members, expand into new markets, or sustain the social networks necessary for recruiting new members. The results may be modest, and the impact may be short-term, but several high-profile cases have demonstrated the power of effective asset seizure and forfeiture programs in disrupting organized crime groups, at least in the short term.

Cooperation among nations is also necessary for effective implementation of this tool, as organized crime groups tend to transfer money internationally, often through countries with low regulatory oversight. FIUs play a vital role in monitoring suspicious transactions and sharing intelligence with law enforcement officials in other countries. Strengthening FIUs in lower-income countries and the processes by which they cooperate with other FIUs seem to be among the more promising interventions available for disrupting organized crime groups.

The success of financial disruption strategies also depends on the overall quality of available financial information. Complex corporate structures, offshore accounts, and trade-based money laundering schemes all make it difficult to track the money, and it is often in the money trail where the most compelling evidence of organized crime activity is found. For the delegate, financial disruption strategies offer a useful complement to law enforcement and development approaches. They will not solve the problem of organized crime, but they may go a long way toward reducing the sustainability of organized crime groups over time.

*Sources: Financial Action Task Force, AML Frameworks and Guidance.*

***j. Economic Prevention and Development Strategies*** If economic disadvantage is one of the structural conditions that helps sustain organized crime, then economic development logically follows as a condition that could potentially reduce organized crime. This is not a new argument, but it is one that needs to be examined rather than accepted at face value, since not all development strategies are equal in their potential to reduce organized crime and because the relationship between economic development and the reduction of organized crime is more complex than it at first seems.

An expansion of financial services is one strategy that has been much discussed in relation to reducing organized crime. Microfinance schemes, small loans for individuals outside the formal banking system, have the potential to provide entrepreneurship and income that did not previously exist. For communities where the informal economy is the norm, an expansion of the formal economy could also make individuals more visible to the system and less likely to be exploited by organized crime groups.

Targeted development programs, such as investments in education, physical infrastructure, employment creation, and social services in high-violence zones, represent a more involved but potentially high-leverage approach. Studies from

various settings suggest that community-level investments can help reduce the economic opportunity for crime and the social conditions that facilitate recruitment into it. The success of this approach likely depends on the level of commitment and resourcing involved.

Conditional cash transfer programs, which have been implemented in various Latin American nations, represent a second potential model. By offering economic support to families based on conditions of schooling or health-seeking behavior, this model has the potential to address poverty and positively influence long-run human capital outcomes. Some research suggests that this model is associated with reduced levels of youth crime, although the precise mechanism is hard to isolate.

What economic prevention models suggest to delegates is that investments in communities are not merely a humanitarian imperative; they also potentially represent a security investment. How this plays out in terms of operational policy at the international level and the associated cost is one of the more substantive issues that this committee could potentially delve into.

*Sources: UNODC crime prevention frameworks; IMF Western Hemisphere Regional Economic Outlook.*

#### ***k. Data and Indicators Relevant to the Debate***

Good policy is based on sound data, and in some ways, homicide is one of the most quantifiably measurable types of violence. As a death, it is recorded in a way that other crimes are not, and the fact that it is expressed as a rate per 100,000 people makes it easy to compare between countries and over time. Indeed, the UNODC publishes a vast amount of data on the global and regional levels in its Global Study on Homicide.

However, it is also the case that the quality of the data varies greatly between regions. In some countries, the figures on homicide may not reflect the true number of deaths, particularly in regions where the state does not have full control or in conflict zones, where the line between homicide and other violence is genuinely difficult to draw. Delegates should bear this in mind, but also acknowledge that the data is, in fact, the best it has ever been.

Aside from the actual statistics of homicide rates, other statistics play important roles in the economic aspects of the matter. These statistics include youth unemployment rates, poverty rates, income inequality rates, and statistics regarding the flow of illicit financial assets. These statistics allow researchers to better understand the dynamics of the violence rates and determine which intervention methods could possibly be the most effective in the matter. These statistics are readily available through the UNODC data portal.

Statistics regarding drug seizures provide another type of useful information in the matter. Changes in drug seizure rates could signal shifts in drug trafficking markets, the development of new markets, and the effectiveness of drug interdiction operations. Suspicious transaction reports from financial agencies could signal the presence of money laundering operations, depending upon the capabilities of the agency that receives the report.

In terms of the delegates, knowledge of the statistics plays an important role in the debate, especially in terms of empirical and practical aspects. Evidence-based arguments are more effective and useful in the matter compared to those that are merely speculative in nature. Working with the actual statistics, including their drawbacks, is what makes the MUN debate effective in simulating actual debates in the matter.

*Sources: UNODC Global Crime Statistics and Data Portal; UNODC, Global Study on Homicide 2023.*

### 13. QUESTIONS TO ADDRESS

- 1- How to eliminate the root causes of violence/homicide?
- 2- What legal frameworks should be implemented in order to achieve success in the matter?
- 3- What other organs of UN and NGOs can support and how?
- 4- Is Geneva Declaration implemented correctly if not why and how can governments and responsible organs implement it into politics further?
- 5- How to break the impact of gangs in society, politics and economy?
- 6- Is it fully possible to get rid of organized crime and how can governments successfully destroy these organizations? ( Considering high- security prisons, trials and framework acts etc.)
- 7- How can governments effectively disrupt illicit financial flows while preserving financial inclusion and economic stability?
- 8- How can international cooperation reduce the misuse of offshore financial centres and secrecy jurisdictions?
- 9- What strategies can states implement to reduce corruption that enables transnational organized crime networks?
- 10- How do economic inequality and lack of development opportunities contribute to the expansion of organized crime networks?
- 11- How has digitalization transformed the financial operations of transnational criminal organizations?
- 12- How can states balance stricter financial regulation with the need to maintain economic competitiveness and investment flows?
- 13- What role should international organizations play in supporting states that lack technical capacity to combat financial crime?

#### 14. BIBLIOGRAPHY

- <https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/Booklet1.pdf>
- <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2025/The-Sustainable-Development-Goals-Report-2025.pdf>
- <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2025>
- <https://www.calismatoplum.org/en/makale/a-study-on-the-effect-of-income-inequality-and-poverty-on-crime-rates/>
- <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/3595600>
- <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/income-inequalitys-most-disturbing-side-effect-homicide/>
- <https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/homicide-rate-unodc>
- <https://www.scielo.br/j/rbp/a/7v5jJmfdtC7CggBQDCxVc6m/?format=html&lang=en>
- <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/the-british-journal-of-psychiatry/article/none-title/BB17B2D10E9FDD52225CCCCC2F53B550>
- <https://www.cdc.gov/aces/about/index.html?>
- <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/violence-against-children?>
- <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/child-maltreatment?>
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s1-zrdBcu3U>
- <https://www.lawyersnjurists.com/article/kinds-of-murder/>
- <https://manshoorylaw.com/blog/difference-between-1st-2nd-and-3rd-degree-murders/>
- <https://unric.org/en/international-law-understanding-justice-in-times-of-war/>
- [https://consult.justice.gov.uk/sentencing-council/manslaughter-guideline-consultation/user\\_uploads/section-one-1.pdf](https://consult.justice.gov.uk/sentencing-council/manslaughter-guideline-consultation/user_uploads/section-one-1.pdf)
- [https://criminalnotebook.ca/index.php/Manslaughter\\_\(Offence\)](https://criminalnotebook.ca/index.php/Manslaughter_(Offence))
- <https://www.diakonia.se/ihl/resources/international-criminal-law/>
- <https://www.scribd.com/document/851698764/UNODC-2023-Global-Study-on-Homicide-2023-Special-Points-of-Interest?>
- [https://www.unodc.org/documents/gsh/pdfs/Chapter\\_2-1.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/gsh/pdfs/Chapter_2-1.pdf)
- <https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2704266/>
- [https://mavmatrix.uta.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1109&context=crcj\\_theses](https://mavmatrix.uta.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1109&context=crcj_theses)

<https://www.cps.gov.uk/prosecution-guidance/gang-related-offences-decision-making>

<https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/what-gang-definitions>

<https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/science/gang-violence-evidence>

<https://www.fftllc.com/blog/youth-gang-involvement>

[https://pure.eur.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/176145102/Triggering\\_Violence.pdf](https://pure.eur.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/176145102/Triggering_Violence.pdf)

<https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6818416/>

<https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/common-characteristics-gangs-examining-cultures-new-urban-tribes>

[https://www.reddit.com/r/changemyview/comments/17xa8ww/cmv\\_gang\\_culture\\_is\\_as\\_close\\_as\\_you\\_can\\_get\\_to/](https://www.reddit.com/r/changemyview/comments/17xa8ww/cmv_gang_culture_is_as_close_as_you_can_get_to/)

<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780323952729000255>

<https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28971349/>

<https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6763120/>

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Street\\_gangs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Street_gangs)

<https://poliisi.fi/en/criminality-by-street-gangs>

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prison\\_gang](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prison_gang)

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organized\\_crime](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organized_crime)

<https://www.unodc.org/cld/zh/education/tertiary/firearms/module-7/key-issues/organized-crime-and-organized-criminal-groups.html>

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crime\\_hotspots](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crime_hotspots)

[https://popcenter.asu.edu/sites/g/files/litvpz3631/files/library/CrimePrevention/Volume\\_04/07-BlockBlock-2.pdf](https://popcenter.asu.edu/sites/g/files/litvpz3631/files/library/CrimePrevention/Volume_04/07-BlockBlock-2.pdf)

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MS-13>

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/18th\\_Street\\_gang](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/18th_Street_gang)

<https://insightcrime.org/el-salvador-organized-crime-news/barrio-18-profile/>

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Primeiro\\_Comando\\_da\\_Capital](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Primeiro_Comando_da_Capital)

<https://insightcrime.org/brazil-organized-crime-news/red-command-profile/>

<https://insightcrime.org/haiti-organized-crime-news/g9-family-profile/>

<https://insightcrime.org/es/noticias-crimen-organizado-venezuela/tren-de-aragua/>

[https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/publications/local\\_attachments/Joint\\_COEProject\\_TrackingCartels02\\_CJNG\\_ResearchBrief\\_June2020.pdf](https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/publications/local_attachments/Joint_COEProject_TrackingCartels02_CJNG_ResearchBrief_June2020.pdf)

<https://www.start.umd.edu/publication/violent-rise-c-rtel-de-jalisco-nueva-generacion-cjng>

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jalisco\\_New\\_Generation\\_Cartel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jalisco_New_Generation_Cartel)

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolutionary\\_Forces\\_of\\_the\\_G9\\_Family\\_and\\_Allies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolutionary_Forces_of_the_G9_Family_and_Allies)

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sicilian\\_Mafia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sicilian_Mafia)

<https://www.acams.org/en/opinion/dissecting-the-mafia-sicily-cosa-nostra>

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camorra>

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albanian\\_mafia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albanian_mafia)

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amnesty\\_International](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amnesty_International)

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/>

<https://www.hrw.org>

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human\\_Rights\\_Watch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_Rights_Watch)

<https://www.hrw.org/about-us>

<https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Crime-statistics/Global-Burden-of-Armed-Violence-full-report.pdf>

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geneva\\_Declaration\\_on\\_Armed\\_Violence\\_and\\_Development](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geneva_Declaration_on_Armed_Violence_and_Development)

<https://cdn.muniverse.co.uk/cloud-conference-research-reports/bmunxviii/unodc-violence-research-report.pdf>

Colombia Reports. "Colombia's Biggest Money Laundering Case of 2022." Colombia Reports, 2022.

Cruz, José Miguel. "The Political Economy of Gang Violence in El Salvador." Latin American Research Review.

Financial Action Task Force. Trade-Based Money Laundering: Trends and Developments. FATF, 2020.

International Monetary Fund. Western Hemisphere Regional Economic Outlook. IMF, 2023.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized Crimes. UNODC, 2011.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Global Study on Homicide 2023. UNODC, 2023.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. "SDG Indicator 16.4.1 Methodology." United Nations, 2022.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. World Drug Report 2023. United Nations, 2023.